Racial Discrimination in the Brazilian Labour Market: Wage, Employment and Segregation Effects by Arcand Jean-Louis & Béatrice d'Hombres
Racial Discrimination in the Brazilian Labour
Market: Wage, Employment and
Segregation E⁄ects￿
Jean-Louis Arcandy BØatrice d￿ Hombresyy
yCERDI-CNRS, UniversitØ d￿ Auvergne & European Development Network
yyCERDI-CNRS, UniversitØ d￿ Auvergne
Forthcoming to Journal of International Development
Abstract
The social science literature has done much to document pervasive racial discrimi-
nation in Brazil and there is little doubt that a very dark color is a handicap to social
advancement. Nevertheless, very few empirical economic studies have attempted to
quantify the impact of ethnic discrimination in Brazil. Using data culled from the
Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios (PNAD), this paper ￿lls this void by
analysing ethnic wage and employment gaps, as well as sectoral segregation in Brazil,
using the Oaxaca decomposition methodology. In addition, we use a quantile regression
approach to see whether the inter-ethnic wage gap is heterogeneous over the conditional
wage distribution
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1 Introduction
Many people in Brazil associate racial discrimination with the hatred of speci￿c eth-
nic groups. They also virulently reject any possibility of racial di⁄erence because of the
widespread belief that Brazilian social relationships are both harmonious and based on
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1principles of equality. In addition, the concept of "racial democracy", as initially devel-
oped by the anthropologist Freyre (1933), emphasizes the importance of miscegenation as
a fundamental characteristic of Brazilian society, and is widely adhered too.1 Moreover, the
￿ uidity of the color line in Brazil, to whit the tendency of a person to declare themselves
￿Brown￿one day and ￿White￿later on if their relative position on the social ladder has
improved, was seen as a serious impediment to the study of racial inequalities. It was not
until the end of the military dictatorship in 1986 that the ￿rst statistical studies dealing
with racial inequalities appeared, since, in the name of national unity, the dictatorship vig-
orously upheld the concept of racial democracy. To that end, the department of sociology
of the University of Sªo Paulo was closed and racial issues were dropped from the 1970
national census. This e⁄ectively prevented all empirical research on racial issues. Only in
1976 did survey data by racial group became available once more.
The studies that ￿ owed in the wake of the 1976 PNAD, all carried out by demogra-
phers and sociologists, highlighted the hurdles faced by Afrobrazilians in terms of their
attempts to improve their relative position in the labour market. Many Brazilians believe,
consciously or otherwise, in a hierarchy of human groups.2 This has led some observers to
propose a¢ rmative action programs geared towards breaking the discrimination inherited
from the past.
The successful implementation of such policies is dependent upon identifying the rel-
ative importance of three types of discrimination that potentially plague the Brazilian
labour market: (i) employment discrimination, (ii) wage discrimination, and (iii) occupa-
tional segregation. Economists have contributed little to this debate and to the best of
our knowledge this paper constitutes the ￿rst study that applies the classic Oaxaca (1973,
1994) methodology to these three problems simultaneously. In contrast to the US liter-
ature, we will treat the black and brown ethnic groups separately, in order to allow for
Degler￿ s (1971) celebrated concept of the ￿mulatto escape hatch￿ : Browns are widely held
to occupy a more priviledged position than are Blacks.3
1Freyre developed this concept while the theory of ￿scienti￿c￿racism based on the biological superiority
of whites was very present in all minds. He originally wished to respond to Vianna (1934) concerning the
advantage of mixture among the Portuguese, Aboriginal and African ethnic groups (see Skidmore 1992).
Before Freyre, several Brazilian scholars presented miscegnation as being the salvation of Brazil through
its ￿whitening￿of the population. The object of these theories was to reconcile the multi-racial aspect of
Brazilian society with the concept of white superiority. In the period following Freyre￿ s work, some authors,
for example Azevedo (1953) or the group of scholars known as the "Sªo Paulo School", led by Fernandes
and Cardoso, concluded that class inequality is far more important than racial inequality.
2This study is limited to quantifying the importance of discrimination on the Brazilian labour market.
The reasons that lie behind discrimination are not examined. Nogueira (1985), Skidmore (1992) and others
have stated that, in Brazil, a person with a darker skin is perceived with a negative a priori. This form of
discrimination would appear to square with the concept of statistical discrimination developed by Phelps
(1972) and Aigner (1977) and which results from imperfect information on the labour market.
3Nevertheless, it is contrary to the results obtained by Silva (1985, 1992) who shows that Blacks and
2The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the methodology used to
decompose the ethnic wage and employment gaps. We also show how to identify the mag-
nitude of sectoral segregation in determining inter-ethnic wages di⁄erences while solving
the index number problem. Section 3 presents the empirical results, while in section 4 we
examine robustness of our results. In order to do so, we apply a decomposition based on a
quantile regression approach. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Decomposition methodology
The Oaxaca methodology (1973, 1994) was initially developed so as to decompose the
earnings gap among groups into a ￿rst component that depends upon individual charac-
teristics that a⁄ect productivity and another component associated with discrimination.
This approach has been extended to allow one (i) to identify inter-occupational and intra-
occupational wage di⁄erences among groups (Brown, Moon, and Zoloth 1980, Neuman and
Silber 1996, Appleton, Hoddinott, and Krishnan 1999) and (ii) to explain di⁄erences in
employment rates (Blackaby, Leslie, Murphy, and O￿ Leary 1998 or Altonji and Blank 1999).





































iis the predicted employment probability for ethnic group i, ’(:) is the average
predicted employment probability, Xi is a vector of endowments, b ￿
i
is a vector of esti-
mated coe¢ cients from the employment probit equation and ￿￿ is the vector of compet-
itive coe¢ cients which would obtain in the absence of discrimination. In his early work




as the non-discriminatory norm. However, Neumark (1988) argued that the appropriate
decomposition should depend on the type of discrimination: on the one hand, employers
may engage in nepotism that favors ethnic group i; on the other hand, they may practice
discrimination against ethnic group j. In the ￿rst case, the employment rate of ethnic
group j would constitute the non-discriminatory norm while in the second case it would
be the employment rate of group i. Eventually, Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom
Browns do not behave di⁄erently. In addition, Lovell (1993) ￿nds that Blacks su⁄er more discrimination
than do Browns.
3(1994) proposed using, as the non-discriminatory norm, the vector of coe¢ cients ￿￿ that
is obtained by estimating the employment probit equation on data which pools all ethnic
groups.4
The ￿rst term in equation (1) represents the portion of the employment rate gap due to
di⁄erences in individual characteristics while the second term is associated with di⁄erences
in coe¢ cients and is attributed to discrimination. The discrimination term is decomposed
into two components: the advantage of ethnic group w and the disadvantage of ethnic
group b relative to a non-discriminatory norm.5
In addition, as in Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980), Neuman and Silber (1996) and
more recently as in Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999), we identify the earnings



















































￿y due to sectoral segregation
];
where p￿
c is the probability of being in sector c in the absence of segregation, pi
c is the
proportion of ethnic group i that belongs to sectoral group c, Z
i
c is the vector of average
endowments of the members of ethnic group i, b ￿
i
c is the vector of estimated coe¢ cients from
the traditional Mincerian wage equation, and b ￿
￿
c is the vector of competitive coe¢ cients.7
Silber (1992) shows that, in the absence of segregation ￿ which corresponds to a Duncan
dissimilarity index of zero ￿ the share of ethnic group i in sector c should be equal to this
4See Neumark (1988) for the assumptions that underlie the theoretical model. Initially, the discussion
was about the competitive wage structure in the case of an earnings equation. See Reimers (1983) or Cotton
(1988) for alternative weighting matrices.
5Note however that the discrimination component may in fact be partly the result of omitted variables,
mispeci￿cation or measurement error. In particular, endogeneity bias may lead to a downwardly or upwardly
biased estimate of the racial gap if the correlation of the explanatory variables with omitted variables
is speci￿c to each ethnic group. See Polachek and Kim (1994) for the impact of these biases on the
decomposition of racial gaps.
6Note that this decomposition implies that the wage gap is the same along the whole of the wage scale.
7This vector of competitive coe¢ cients is obtained by estimating a wage equation on data which pools
all ethnic groups.
4sectoral￿ s share of the labour market.8 As stated by Neuman and Silber (1996), this means
that one assumes that the reallocation of workers between occupations does not a⁄ect the
occupational wage structure. Technically, the implication is that p￿












c is the number of individuals of ethnic group i working in sector c and Ni is the
number of individuals of ethnic group i in the labour market. Another approach, proposed
by Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980) and Miller (1987), assumes that one of the two groups
does not su⁄er from sectoral segregation, although this implies that their estimates su⁄er
from an index number problem. These authors do, however, go further, in that they
decompose the segregation e⁄ect into two components, the ￿rst stemming from di⁄erences
in endowments and the second corresponding to a ￿pure￿segregation e⁄ect. In order to do
so and simultaneously solve the index number problem, one must estimate the coe¢ cients
associated with sectoral choice that one would obtain in the absence of segregation. Using
































c is the vector of coe¢ cients speci￿c to each sector obtained by estimating a multinominal
logit model of sectoral choice on pooled data (N observations) and Wj is the vector of
explanatory variables that a⁄ect sectoral choice.9 We can then decompose the earnings
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9See Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999) who also solve the index number problem.
5where b p￿i
c is is the proportion of ethnic group i that belongs to occupational group c if he
faced the common structure b ￿
￿
c. The ￿rst term on the right-hand-side represents the ￿pure￿
e⁄ect of segregation, while the second term is that part of the wage gap due to di⁄erences in
sectoral employment attributes. This decomposition allows one to take sectoral di⁄erences
in earnings into account.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
The dataset is derived from the 1998 national household survey (PNAD) collected by
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).10 The sample, composed of
males of between 25 and 65 years of age, covers 69;956 individuals of whom 52:78% are
Whites, 41:11% Browns, and 6:11% Blacks.11
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the three ethnic groups broken down into
employed and unemployed individuals. The employment rate is de￿ned as the percentage
of individuals who were employed during the interview week.12 The rate of predicted
employment, which di⁄ers signi￿cantly by ethnic group, is equal to 88:92%, 84:98% and
82:51% respectively for Whites, Browns and Blacks.13
Figure 1 in the Appendix presents the cumulative density function of the logarithm of
hourly wage-earnings, by ethnic group. As should be obvious from Figure 1, there is a
clear shift to the right of the respective cumulative densities (as in ￿rst order stochastic
dominance) as one moves from Afro-Brazilians to the white ethnic group. However, there
is no clear di⁄erence between Browns and Blacks. This same tendency emerges in Table 1.
10The data are available on their web site at http://www.ibge.gov.br
11The de￿nition of an ethnic group in Brazil is fraught with di¢ culties. In particular, there is a bewilder-
ingly large number of terms that are used to refer to a person￿ s ethnic origin or skin colour (135 according
to 1976 PNAD). Lovell (1999), who provides a useful summary of the current state of the literature, notes
that a study by Silva (1996) ￿nds that only 57 percent of individuals faced with an open question in terms
of their color classify themselves into one of the three groups refered to here. On the other hand, when
faced with a closed question expressed in terms of the three above-mentioned groups, all individuals are
able and (more or less) willing to classify themselves. Individuals of the asian ethnic group were excluded
from our sample as they did not constitute a group of su¢ cient magnitude.
12We consider the unemployment rate as the percentage of individuals aged between 25 and 65 who were
unemployed during the interview week. We are conscious of the fact that we should have only considered
individuals who are both unemployed and actively looking for employment. However, many individuals
in Brazil do not have the opportunity to actively search for a job because of the extremely di¢ cult social
conditions in their neighbourhoods.
13Note that the probit model implies that the predicted employment probability is slightly di⁄erent from
the actual employment rate.
6Table 1: Summary Statistics: Adult Males, by Ethnic Group
Unemployed Employed
Racial group Whites Browns Blacks Whites Browns Blacks
Number of obs. 4090 4319 747 32833 24442 3525
Age: mean 31:81 30:34 31:50 37:62 35:79 36:47
(std deviation) (13:16) (12:47) (12:69) (11:62) (11:81) (11:89)
Hourly earnings (in Reais) 4:94 2:38 2:34
Yrs of completed schooling 6:53 4:77 4:87 7:40 5:01 5:05
(std. deviation) 3:97 3:66 3:57 (4:39) (4:00) (3:91)
Region of residence (%)
North 3:88 10:02 2:81 3:68 11:92 3:71
Northeast 23:44 52:07 41:36 15:70 43:67 31:97
Central Brazil 8:54 10:07 8:43 10:54 14:05 7:60
South 27:40 5:25 8:56 29:45 5:54 10:57
Southeast 36:74 22:59 38:84 40:63 24:82 46:15
Self-evaluation of health (%)
Bad health 2:76 3:33 3:32 1:73 2:49 2:21
Occupational sector (%)
Professional, Technical 9:64 4:59 4:91
Administration 19:79 10:47 8:57
Services 2:79 3:46 3:77
Trades 14:77 13:48 10:16
Transportation 9:39 8:27 8:11
Industry 29:06 34:91 44:14
Agriculture 14:56 24:82 20:34
Formal sector dummy 42:53 34:37 41:98
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
The hourly wages of Blacks are on average half of those of Whites, whereas Browns appear
to do as well as Blacks. Moreover, Afrobrazilians work mainly in the agricultural and
industrial sectors where the average number of years of schooling is smaller. Di⁄erences
in earnings and employment attributes may partly explain the ethnic-speci￿c nature of
the employment rates, earnings and sectoral distributions. Browns and Blacks are largely
penalized in terms of human capital (educational attainment, labour market experience
and health) with respect to Whites, and this is true whether they are employed or not.
Moreover, the concentration of Blacks and Browns is higher in the poorer regions of Brazil
(North and Northeast), a geographic concentration that stems from three centuries of
slavery. Lastly, Afrobrazilians are more concentrated in rural areas, which should also
penalize them in terms of employment opportunities.
73.2 Results
Table 2 displays the employment and earnings decomposition results. The ￿rst part
of Table 2 displays the employment decomposition results. Employment probit equations





. The attributes a⁄ecting employment that we considered include age, age squared, years
of schooling, self-evaluation of health, family status, region of residence, location (urban
or rural) and presence of a young child.14
The results presented in Table 2 highlight that the employment gap between Browns
and Whites is to a great extent due to di⁄erences in endowments (82:98%). This means (in
the absence of pre-entry discrimination on the labour market, which we deal with at greater
length below) that the shortfall in the rate of employment faced by Browns is mainly the
outcome of social inequalities inherited from the past, rather than discrimination.15 In
other words, it suggests that for Browns, racial inequality could be a purely transitory
phenomenon. In contrast, for Blacks, the shortfall in the rate of employment is explained by
the two e⁄ects (endowment and discrimination) which are of roughly equivalent magnitude.
The second part of Table 2 displays the earnings decomposition results. We decomposed
the ethnic wage gap while adjusting for self-selection into employment (Heckman, 1979).16
The attributes assumed to a⁄ect the logarithm of hourly wages considered were: experience
on the labour market (age minus years of schooling minus 6), experience squared, years
of schooling, self-evaluation of health, family status, region of residence, location (urban
14See Table 4 of the Appendix for the estimates that underlie these results.
15Using a linear probability model does not change these results.
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i is the average inverse Mills ratio, which controls for selectivity into employment and ^ ￿
i
c repre-
sents the coe¢ cients estimated from the earnings equations by sector (see Neuman and Oaxaca 2003 for
alternatives and more detailed decompositions). We then analyse the adjusted wage di⁄erentials and not
the observed wage di⁄erentials. The presence of a young child was used as the identifying variable in the
employment probits. Note that one cannot use exclusion restrictions based on variables such as household
income purged of the income of the individual who corresponds to the observation in question, because such
variables would obviously not be orthogonal to unobserved characteristics linked to ethnically-determined
wage di⁄erences. Note that the standard approach to correcting for selectivity bias assumes that the errors
are normally distributed. See Schafgans (2000) for a semi-parametric approach that relaxes this assumption.
Finally, there is potentially another source of selectivity bias due to the endogeneity of sectoral employment
choice (see Appleton, Hoddinott, and Krishnan 1999).
8Table 2: Decomposition of Ethnic Employment and Earnings Di⁄erences
Components Browns Blacks
Employment Decomposition
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Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
or rural), and signature of a formal labour contract. Earnings functions were estimated
for each ethnic group and each sector.17 Doing so allowed us to apply the classical de-
composition procedure to each sector. In addition, a multinominal logit speci￿cation was
estimated on pooled data in order to determine b ￿
￿
c and ^ pi￿
c . We considered the following
seven agregated sectors : Professional and Technical, Services, Administration, Trades,
Transportation, Industry and Agriculture.18 In Table 5 of the Appendix, we present the
actual distribution of each ethnic group, as well as the distribution that would prevail
17See Tables 6, 7, 8 of the Appendix. All the estimates display the usual pattern, that is to say, hourly
earnings increase along with the human capital variables (years of completed schooling, health dummy).
There are also important variations by region.
18If the sectors were ordered according to the type of quali￿cation required we would have been able to
estimate an ordered probit, as suggested by numerous authors. However, as stated by Meng and Miller
(1995), the estimates provided by the ordered probit and those provided by the multinominal logit are quite
similar.
9if their speci￿c attributes were rewarded as if there were "no discrimination" (common
structure of coe¢ cients, b ￿
￿
c). Finally, the last row displays the sectoral distribution in the
absence of segregation.
The shortfall in wages su⁄ered by the brown and black ethnic groups can be explained
by three e⁄ects of di⁄erent magnitude. First, lower levels of endowments explain more
than half of inter-ethnic di⁄erences in wages. This e⁄ect should vanish with time if there
is no discrimination in terms of access to educational and other opportunities, which may
not be the case. Second, ￿pure￿discrimination, respectively for Browns and Blacks, ac-
counts for 23 and 35 percent of the shortfall. It is interesting to note that the wage gap
is slightly larger for Browns, but that the discrimination component (in percentage terms)
is greater for Blacks. This corresponds to the same pattern as with the employment de-
composition. While a¢ rmative action programs may reduce labour market discrimination,
available evidence for Brazil suggests that prejudice lies at its heart: as such, a¢ rmative
action programs may exacerbate this form of prejudice by suggesting that success is not
wholly based on merit.19 Moreover, prejudice-based discrimination can be eliminated by
permanent programs, which run counter to the principles upon which such initiatives are
formulated in Brazil. Programs aimed at heightening awareness concerning the value of
ethnic diversity might constitute a complementary and promising approach.
Finally, the most striking result is that the impact of sectoral segregation is negligible.
Therefore, programs aimed at facilitating the access of Afro-Brazilians to sectors where
they are underrepresented do not appear as a legitimate course of action in the Brazilian
case. This is either because existing programs have done their job or because there was
(and remains) no sectoral segregation to speak of.
4 Robustness
4.1 Potential problems
Despite the relatively clear picture that emerges from our results, they should be inter-
preted with caution.
First, as we have already mentioned, we have restricted our attention so far to average
inter-ethnic di⁄erences. In other words, if one takes the case of the wage decompositions, a
given level of average discrimination against blacks can hide important di⁄erences according
to that portion of the wage distribution over which the discrimination obtains. For example,
a relatively low average level of discrimination could stem from a high level of discrimination
that only a⁄ects a given segment of the distribution. An example of how to deal with this
19See in particular Beghin and Jaccoud (2002) for a discussion of this topic.
10issue is provided by Arias et al (2004), Garcia et al (2001) or Mwabu et Schultz (1996),
who carry out Oaxaca decompositions where the associated coe¢ cients are speci￿c to each
quantile of the wage distribution.20
Second, we are unable to isolate those factors stemming from inequality of opportunity
before entry into the labour market. In particular, the Brazilian educational system is
characterized by the coexistence at all levels of private and public institutions that di⁄er
greatly in quality. Only wealthier students (i.e., whites) can a⁄ord private schools which
yield higher returns to schooling.21 A portion of what we attribute to discrimination on the
labour market may thus be due to the impact of di⁄erences in educational quality on the
returns to schooling, stemming from whether students attended private or public schools.
Another way of putting this is that we are unable to isolate that portion of discrimination
due to inequality of opportunity that ￿ ows from di⁄erences in family background.22 In
addition, di⁄erences in the level of services o⁄ered at the municipal level could also lead to
a bias in the estimated endowment e⁄ect through their impact on individual educational
attainment. Unfortunately, we do not have information concerning family background and
municipality of birth. Moreover, while the federally-funded SUS (Uni￿ed and decentralized
healthcare system), set up in 1988, theoretically guarantees universal access regardless of
income, Brazil is in fact characterized by municipal heterogeneity in healthcare quality
(see Lobato 2001).23 The inequality of opportunity that ￿ ows from an individual￿ s place
of residence (Afrobrazilians are mainly concentrated in poorer areas of the North and
Northeast) also leads us to be cautious concerning the interpretation of our results.24
Note that our results do not identify discrimination e⁄ects stemming from potential
inter-ethnic di⁄erences in access to formal sector jobs. This is because it was impossible to
simultaneously estimate segregation e⁄ects in the seven agregate sectors of the economy,
20Jenkins (1994) suggests comparing the Lorenz curve associated with the conditional distribution of
wages with the concentration curve (the Lorenz curve constructed on the basis of identical regression
coe¢ cients for all ethnic groups). He then suggests computing a series of agregate discrimination indices
which allow one to account for the degree of discrimination as it varies along the conditional distribution.
Note however, that this approach forces the determinants of the structure of wages to be constant across
the entire distribution. For alternative procedures that relax this assumption, see DiNardo et al (1996),
Bonjour and Ger￿n (2001), Bourguignon et al (2002).
21See HerrÆn and Rodr￿guez (2001) for a complete discussion concerning heterogeneity in the quality of
education in Brazil.
22See Bourguignon, Ferreira and MenØndez (2003).
23Including 807 municipality of residence dummies (there are more than 5500 municipalities in Brazil,
807 are included in PNAD data) would have in part controled for this problem but it is obviously impossible
for degrees of freedom reasons.
24In addition, as stressed by Karlsen and Nazroo (2002) there is also a potential e⁄ect of discrimination
in health outcomes through the violence to which individuals are subjected and the psychological stress to
which they are exposed through living in a racially segregated society. However it is di¢ cult to quantitatively
control for these e⁄ects.
11Table 3: Decomposition of Ethnic Earnings Di⁄erences, by Wage Quantile
￿ 0:05 0:10 0:25 0:50 0:75 0:90
Browns
Wage di⁄erential adjusted 0:591 0:595 0:593 0:663 0:726 0:779
Endowments 0:476 0:481 0:484 0:521 0:554 0:576
(80:5%) (80:8%) (81:6%) (78:6%) (76:3%) (73:91%)
Discrimination 0:115 0:114 0:109 0:142 0:172 0:203
(19:5%) (19:2%) (18:4%) (21:4%) (23:7%) (26:1%)
Blacks
Wage di⁄erential adjusted 0:507 0:414 0:630 0:698 0:879 0:953
Endowments 0:305 0:319 0:353 0:405 0:457 0:495
(60:1%) (77%) (56%) (58%) (52%) (51:9%)
Discrimination 0:232 0:095 0:277 0:293 0:422 0:458
(39:9%) (23%) (44%) (42%) (48%) (48:1%)
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998
while dividing each into formal and informal sectors, for statistical reasons.25
In what follows, to take these potential problems into account, we consider a decom-
position based on quantile regressions. Note that we are unable to apply this method by
sector because of the relatively small sample sizes that would result from doing so. The
results that follow are therefore based on the assumption that there is no sectoral segrega-
tion, an assumption that would appear to be reasonable given that no sectoral segregation
was identi￿ed at the average level. In order to partially account for the second problem
(inequality of opportunity) we include state dummies.26
4.2 Quantile regression
Results by wage quantile (each one being denoted by ￿, where ￿ = 0:05; 0:10;0:25;0:5;0:75;0:90)
are presented in Tables 9 to 11:27 The procedure is equivalent to minimizing the weighted
sum of the absolute values of the residuals, the weights being given by the corresponding
25This is because the resulting subsamples become too small for one to be able to have con￿dence in
the resulting statistical inference. Note, however that we carried out an Oaxaca decomposition on the
basis of the formal-informal dichotomy which we do not present here for the sake of brevity. No signi￿cant
discrimination e⁄ect obtains, all di⁄erences being explained by the "endowment e⁄ect".
26We also include occupational dummies.
27See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a review of quantile regression methods.
12￿. In the last column of the tables, we report the corresponding OLS coe¢ cient in order
to facilitate comparisons.
Formally speaking, the quantile wage decompositions take the form:
Q￿(Y w=Z






















where Q￿(:) is the ￿th quantile of the conditional distribution of Y i evaluated at the mean of
the vector of charactØristics Z
i and b ￿
i
￿ is speci￿c to each wage quantile. We therefore have
the wage gap for quantile ￿, evaluated at the mean sample characteristics (not the mean
quantile characteristics). This follows from the fact that b ￿
i
￿E(Zi=Y i = Y i
￿) 6= E(Y i=Y i =
Y i
￿), as opposed to the OLS results, in which Y
i = b ￿
i
Z.28
The wage decompositions are presented in Table 3.29 The results corroborate those
presented earlier, in that the extent of discrimination remains much higher for Blacks than
for Browns. There is however, a tendency for discrimination to increase as one moves up the
wage distribution. For example, for ￿ = 0:10, 19:2% and 23% of the wage gap is attributed
to discrimination for Blacks and Browns, respectively, whereas the corresponding ￿gures
are 26:1% and 48:1% for ￿ = 0:90.Note that we also conducted wage dØcompositions
without correcting for the selection bias. The results thus obtained corroborate the ones
set out in this study.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated ethnic wage and employment gaps in Brazil. We have found
that discrimination in the Brazilian labour market is present, particularly with respect to
wages. Nevertheless, this does not mean that discrimination is absent in employment insofar
as unemployment duration may vary by ethnic group. We have also highlighted that there
are no great di⁄erences in the employment and wage gaps su⁄ered by blacks versus those
a⁄ecting browns. In contrast, the portion of the gaps due to discrimination is far more
28For an alternative decomposition, see Machado et Mata (2004). Note that we account for sample selec-
tion bias and that we are therefore decomposing an adjusted wage gap rather than an observed wage gap.
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￿￿ ￿
b); where ￿ ￿
i is the average inverse Mills ratio, which controls for selectivity into employ-
ment and ^ ￿
i
￿ is speci￿c to each wage quintile. See Buchinky (1998) for an approach that also accounts for
the bias stemming from quantile regression.
29The introduction of state dummies signi￿cantly reduces the return to education. Therefore, without
state dummies, the OLS estimate leads to a return to education of 16.4% for Whites. It reaches 12.9% and
11.9% for half-casts and Blacks. This veri￿es the existence of high disparities between States in the quality
of education and job opportunities.
13important in the case of Blacks.30 This result is robust to a decomposition based on wage
quantiles. Not only does racial prejudice appear to a⁄ect Blacks more than Browns, its
extent also increases as one moves up the conditional distribution of wages.
This result is in line with the idea that racial prejudice a⁄ects Blacks more than it does
Browns. However, a portion of the discrimination and of endowment e⁄ects estimated here
are potentially due to unequal opportunities in an individual￿ s capacity to ￿nance a private
education.
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17Table 4: Employment Equations, by Ethnic Group
Full


























































































Observations 69956 36923 28761 4272
Note: Probit Speci￿cation.
White heteroskedasticity-consistent absolute value of t-statistics below coe¢ cients.
18Table 5: Predicted and Actual Occupational Distribution
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pi
c White 0:096 0:197 0:027 0:295 0:147 0:093 0:145
Brown 0:045 0:104 0:034 0:353 0:134 0:082 0:248
Black 0:049 0:085 0:037 0:444 0:101 0:081 0:203
b p￿i
c White 0:095 0:175 0:033 0:293 0:154 0:093 0:157
Brown 0:043 0:113 0:041 0:317 0:147 0:087 0:252
Black 0:042 0:115 0:043 0:346 0:144 0:098 0:212
p￿
c 0:073 0:153 0:031 0:323 0:140 0:089 0:191
(1) Professional and Technical, (2) Administration, (3) Service, (4) Industry,
(5) Trade, (6) Transportation, (7) Agriculture.
pi
c is the actual proportion of ethnic group i in the relevant sector.
b p￿i
c is the predicted proportion of ethnic group i in the relevant sector if it
faced "non-discriminatory" coe¢ cients (common structure b ￿
￿
c) from the occupational
choice model estimated using a multinomial logit on pooled data.
p￿
c is the proportion of each ethnic group in the absence of segregation.
19Table 6: Wage Equations*, by Sector, for Whites
White group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience 0:063 0:068 0:045 0:061 0:068 0:056 0:060
[13:64] [19:15] [12:14] [28:54] [18:88] [13:04] [7:89]
(Experience)2 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001
[9:05] [11:42] [9:97] [21:55] [14:31] [9:71] [6:57]
Yrs of schooling 0:187 0:154 0:117 0:118 0:142 0:101 0:103
[33:39] [48:81] [23:40] [48:12] [40:46] [21:46] [10:85]
Formal sector ￿0:059 ￿0:126 0:206 0:172 0:018 ￿0:133 0:066
[2:04] [6:01] [9:70] [13:87] [0:75] [5:50] [1:46]
Bad health ￿0:067 ￿0:171 ￿0:243 ￿0:254 ￿0:287 ￿0:257 ￿0:333
[0:35] [1:39] [4:22] [4:56] [2:53] [2:88] [1:50]
Household head 0:570 0:648 0:608 0:609 0:595 0:527 0:553
[15:48] [22:52] [21:58] [38:10] [20:22] [16:71] [10:13]
Region of residence
Northeast ￿0:206 ￿0:154 ￿0:296 ￿0:359 ￿0:345 ￿0:306 ￿0:540
[4:89] [4:65] [9:34] [16:57] [9:90] [8:39] [6:91]
Southeast 0:018 0:037 0:090 0:128 0:011 0:125 0:015
[0:55] [1:60] [3:45] [9:46] [0:43] [4:82] [0:28]
Central Brazil 0:102 0:137 0:170 ￿0:019 ￿0:005 ￿0:003 ￿0:081
[2:14] [3:95] [5:34] [0:76] [0:13] [0:05] [1:02]
Urban area 0:223 0:255 0:180 0:163 0:173 0:138 0:378
[2:81] [6:06] [7:95] [7:97] [3:20] [3:14] [6:02]
Constant ￿1:934 ￿1:841 ￿2:139 ￿1:859 ￿1:971 ￿1:298 ￿1:991
[18:62] [31:27] [34:27] [51:81] [27:05] [16:59] [16:20]
Observations 3164 6497 4784 9541 4848 3084 915
R-squared 0:51 0:45 0:32 0:47 0:43 0:33 0:37
White heteroskedasticity-consistent absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.
* Wage equation adjusted for the self-selection bias into employment.
(1) Professional and Technical, (2) Administration, (3) Service, (4) Industry, (5) Trade, (6) Transportation,
(7) Agriculture.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
20Table 7: Wage Equations*, by Sector, for Browns
Brown group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience 0:056 0:077 0:055 0:072 0:065 0:062 0:075
[7:04] [15:27] [16:42] [30:43] [14:43] [12:00] [11:39]
(Experience)2 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001
[4:24] [9:24] [14:31] [23:08] [11:48] [8:89] [10:51]
Yrs of schooling 0:152 0:150 0:096 0:106 0:121 0:085 0:093
[21:99] [30:28] [20:49] [41:73] [26:47] [15:79] [11:94]
Formal sector 0:016 ￿0:138 0:298 0:191 0:026 0:083 0:190
[0:33] [4:16] [16:98] [14:71] [0:90] [2:73] [4:27]
Bad health ￿0:371 ￿0:436 ￿0:356 ￿0:447 ￿0:641 ￿0:317 ￿0:177
[1:35] [2:72] [8:03] [9:79] [7:60] [3:11] [1:16]
Household head 0:668 0:682 0:577 0:615 0:744 0:581 0:556
[11:30] [16:40] [26:60] [37:55] [20:75] [15:44] [11:53]
Region of residence
Northeast ￿0:171 ￿0:255 ￿0:296 ￿0:265 ￿0:139 ￿0:261 ￿0:290
[2:75] [5:90] [10:71] [14:26] [3:58] [6:31] [4:27]
Southeast ￿0:011 0:013 ￿0:069 0:117 0:099 0:106 0:114
[0:16] [0:27] [2:36] [6:18] [2:34] [2:51] [1:56]
Central Brazil 0:247 0:086 0:169 0:077 0:239 0:143 0:088
[3:38] [1:65] [5:57] [3:35] [4:98] [2:57] [1:07]
Urban area 0:237 0:426 0:151 0:172 0:195 0:216 0:280
[2:31] [7:98] [8:01] [8:26] [3:45] [4:37] [4:62]
Constant ￿1:920 ￿2:353 ￿2:271 ￿2:151 ￿2:300 ￿1:744 ￿2:290
[15:00] [28:25] [41:62] [53:19] [27:39] [19:25] [19:34]
Observations 1121 2560 6065 8533 3296 2021 846
R-squared 0:54 0:49 0:34 0:50 0:40 0:37 0:45
White heteroskedasticity-consistent absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.
* Wage equation adjusted for the self-selection bias into employment.
(1) Professional and Technical, (2) Administration, (3) Service, (4) Industry, (5) Trade, (6) Transportation,
(7) Agriculture.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
21Table 8: Wage Equations*, by Sector, for Blacks
Black group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience 0:064 0:061 0:033 0:061 0:053 0:075 0:054
[3:08] [5:35] [3:98] [10:69] [4:17] [6:72] [2:68]
(Experience)2 ￿0:001 ￿0:000 ￿0:000 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001
[2:27] [3:17] [3:27] [7:31] [4:38] [5:08] [2:90]
Yrs of schooling 0:172 0:139 0:074 0:105 0:110 0:109 0:024
[8:79] [12:37] [6:10] [18:35] [8:22] [6:44] [0:99]
Formal sector 0:028 0:038 0:239 0:156 ￿0:023 0:210 0:146
[0:19] [0:46] [4:94] [5:20] [0:29] [2:48] [1:10]
Bad health ￿0:209 ￿0:158 ￿0:579 ￿0:462 ￿0:660 ￿0:183 ￿0:623
[0:89] [0;49] [4:85] [3:07] [1:62] [1:13] [2:17]
Household head 0:656 0:661 0:530 0:579 0:745 0:434 0:674
[4:94] [7:27] [9:63] [16:05] [7:73] [4:58] [4:27]
Region of residence
Northeast ￿0:663 ￿0:493 ￿0:241 ￿0:361 ￿0:594 ￿0:406 ￿0:238
[3:98] [4:09] [3:07] [7:63] [4:70] [3:15] [1:11]
Southeast ￿0:300 ￿0:231 0:038 0:023 ￿0:107 ￿0:049 0:026
[1:74] [2:29] [0:52] [0:57] [0:86] [0:39] [0:13]
Central Brazil ￿0:426 ￿0:167 0:107 ￿0:131 ￿0:308 ￿0:095 ￿0:090
[1:59] [1:17] [1:00] [1:79] [1:61] [0:53] [0:38]
Urban area ￿0:126 0:422 0:210 0:224 0:213 0:200 0:329
[0:38] [2:29] [4:54] [4:03] [1:76] [2:18] [2:02]
Constant ￿1:663 ￿2:105 ￿1:946 ￿2:020 ￿1:716 ￿1:991 ￿1:759
[3:72] [8:68] [14:75] [22:27] [7:38] [8:55] [4:45]
Observations 173 302 717 1556 358 286 133
R-squared 0:57 0:55 0:35 0:48 0:49 0:39 0:31
White heteroskedasticity-consistent absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.
* Wage equation adjusted for the self-selection bias into employment.
(1) Professional and Technical, (2) Administration, (3) Service, (4) Industry, (5) Trade, (6) Transportation,
(7) Agriculture.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998
22Table 9: Wage Equations*, by Wage Quantile, for Whites
White group
￿ 0:05 0.10 0:25 0:50 0:75 0:90 0:95 OLS
Experience 0:032 0:035 0:041 0:047 0:050 0:050 0:047 0:0044
[14:04] [18:48] [32:26] [34:88] [34:90] [24:04] [16:63] [37:46]
(Experience)2 ￿0:0004 ￿0:0004 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005
[14:31] [15:78] [26:16] [26:48] [￿24:51] [15:52] [9:49] [27:54]
Yrs of schooling 0:077 0:084 0:097 0:111 0:124 0:130 0:135 0:111
[30:19] [40:37] [69:65] [74:41] [74:89] [50:05] [38:65] [84:98]
Formal sector 0:267 0:219 0:130 0:027 ￿0:088 ￿0:198 ￿0:279 0:001
[16:73] [16:79] [14:37 [2:84] [￿8:43] [12:70] [13:28] [0:22]
Bad health ￿0:329 ￿0:232 ￿0:196 ￿0:117 ￿0:083 ￿0:131 ￿0:012 ￿0:150
[5:80] [5:03] [6:22] [3:51] [2:34] [2:47] [0:34] [5:13]
Household head 0:226 0:237 0:235 0:225 0:211 0:212 0:209 0:233
[11:21] [14:35] [20:62] [18:44] [16:07] [10:77] [7:88] [21:74]
Urban area 0:191 0:184 0:143 0:141 0:133 0:130 0:141 0:151
[7:51] [8:76] [9:79] [9:05] [8:05] [5:21] [4:26] [11:01]
Constant ￿1:585 ￿1:363 ￿1:00 ￿0:721 ￿0:158 0:354 0:645 ￿0:557
[14:00] [14:94] [31:08] [10:96] [2:26] [3:41] [4:59] [9:65]
R2 0:269 0:2776 0:3068 0:335 0:362 0:3542 0:3348 0:5270
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.
State and occupational dummies included in all speci￿cations.
* Wage equation adjusted for the self-selection bias into employment.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
23Table 10: Wage Equations*, by Wage Quantile, for Browns
Brown group
￿ 0:05 0.10 0:25 0:50 0:75 0:90 0:95 OLS
Experience 0:018 0:032 0:036 0:042 0:047 0:049 0:053 0:0041
[9:97] [16:07] [24:47] [32:60] [29:55] [21:37] [14:52] [30:65]
(Experience)2 ￿0:0004 ￿0:0004 ￿0:004 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005
[10:05] [15:31] [21:51] [26:73] [22:63] [15:42] [10:02] [24:76]
Yrs of schooling 0:052 0:059 0:070 0:085 0:100 0:111 0:117 0:088
[16:62] [26:80] [43:01] [58:68] [53:43] [40:20] [26:37] [58:31]
Formal sector 0:372 0:283 0:199 0:110 0:016 ￿0:071 ￿0:120 0:098
[19:34] [20:29] [18:82] [11:63] [1:38] [4:17] [4:36] [10:00]
Bad health ￿0:179 ￿0:262 ￿0:218 ￿0:211 [0:206 ￿0:268 ￿0:275 ￿0:243
[3:25] [6:70 [7:46] [8:10] [6:44] [5:94] [3:89] [8:97]
Household head 0:163 0:162 0:157 0:161 0:177 0:223 0:195 0:194
[7:01] [9:82] [12:86] [14:79] [13:13] [11:48] [6:32] [17:12]
Urban area 0:136 0:134 0:126 0:110 0:089 0:094 0:111 0:122
[5:13] [7:17] [8:94] [8:95] [5:99] [4:42] [3:27] [9:57]
Constant ￿1:418 ￿1:280 ￿0:949 ￿0:571 ￿0:166 0:265 0:320 ￿0:596
[12:36] [15:87] [15:68] [10:67] [2:54] [2:92] [2:21] [10:50]
R2 0:2668 0:2527 0:262 0:288 0:301 0:3165 0:3134 0:4657
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.
State and occupational dummies included in all speci￿cations.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
24Table 11: Wage Equations*, by Wage Quantile, for Blacks
Black group
￿ 0:05 0.10 0:25 0:50 0:75 0:90 0:95 OLS
Experience 0:030 0:026 0:033 0:035 0:033 0:048 0:048 0:034
[4:55] [4:36] [7:23] [10:48] [8:71] [8:16] [6:05] [10:45]
(Experience)2 ￿0:0004 ￿0:0003 ￿0:004 ￿0:0004 ￿0:0003 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0005 ￿0:0004
[4:52 [4:08] [6:30] [8:53] [6:38] [5:88] [4:45] [8:43]
Yrs of schooling 0:053 0:051 0:072 0:081 0:097 0:113 0:118 0:086
[6:85 [7:49] [14:10] [21:18] [21:47] [15:35] [10:41] [22:93]
Formal sector 0:331 0:238 0:189 0:151 0:070 ￿0:003 ￿0:014 0:135
[7:10] [5:78] [6:06] [6:43] [2:61] [0:07] [0:23] [5:88]
Bad health ￿0:785 ￿0:522 ￿0:331 ￿0:267 ￿0:247 ￿0:099 ￿0:005 ￿0:321
[5:37] [4:06] [3:49] [3:72] [3:14] [0:77] [0:04] [4:57]
Household head 0:133 0:135 0:147 0:194 0:256 0:169 0:190 0:207
[2:57] [2:82] [4:02] [7:02] [7:98] [3:38] [2:62] [7:64]
Urban area 0:109 0:126 0:096 0:159 0:203 0:161 0:165 0:157
[1:48] [2:05] [2:09] [4:67] [5:37] [2:62] [1:70] [4:70]
Constant ￿1:771 ￿1:089 ￿1:184 ￿1:168 ￿1:179 ￿0:733 ￿0:637 ￿1:086
[9:28] [3:21] [4:41] [5:96] [5:68] [2:17] [2:54] [5:50]
R2 0:288 0:2696 0:2858 0:297 0:296 0:3233 0:3431 0:4711
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.
State and occupational dummies included in all speci￿cations.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
25Figure 1: Cumulative densities of log hourly Wage, by ethnic group
26